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RESTITUTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
FOR A TORT
LUDWIG TELLER
RESTITUTION is a term now widely used to define the remedy
which older practitioners customarily describe by the words quasi-
contracts. The remedy of restitution is designed to prevent unjust
enrichment; the measure of recovery is not the plaintiff's damage but
the benefit secured or reaped by the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff.
The preference for restitution as the descriptive word comes from
three main purposes: first, to indicate the inclusion of equitable
remedies of a quasi-contractual nature, like subrogation, the equita-
ble lien, the constructive trust; second, to get away from many of
the historical abstractions attached to the common counts in general
assumpsit which often limit the availability of the restitutionary reme-
dy; third, to point up the broad purview of the remedy, and the ex-
tent to which it is a distinct subject which cuts across all branches
of the law. It is a vehicle for effectuating justice in numerous situa-
tions where accustomed remedial categories may prove inadequate.'
A significant contribution to the subject of restitution was re-
cently made in New York by the Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, in Dentists Supply Co. of New York v. Cornelius,' whose de-
cision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion. The
present article is devoted to the ramifications of the decision in this
case, in relation to the action for restitution as an alternative remedy.
LuDwxG TEER, of the New York Bar, is a Professor of Law at New York Law
School, a member of the New York State Legislature, and the author of the treatise
Tnn LAW GoVEwmnG LABOR DispumTs AND COLLECTIVE BAoAnnnG and other books
and articles. The present article is in substance part of a forthcoming treatise on
Restitution.
1 Keener's work on quasi-contracts published in 1893, which was followed by
Woodward's book in 1913, marked out some of the boundaries of the quasi-contrac-
tual remedy. Then this important remedy was allowed to become an unclassified
appendage of other subjects until the publication in 1937 of the monumental Restate-
ment of Restitution by the American Law Institute. "Restitution is a term unknown
to legal treatises, encyclopedias and digests, yet it represents one of a trinity of prin-
ciples which actuate the proceedings for remedial justice. The law of contracts en-
forces promises. The rules of tort provide compensation for harm. Restitution is the
equitable principle by which one who has been enriched at the expense of another,
whether by mistake or otherwise, is under a duty to return what has been received
or its value to the other." Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OxA. L. RPv. 257
(1954).
2 281 App. Div. 306, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1st Dep't. 1953), aff'd. on certified
questions, 306 N. Y. 624, 116 N. E. 2d 238 (1953).
RESTITUTION AS ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
It appeared in the Cornelius case that the plaintiff's goods were
transferred by his agent without authority to the defendant. This,
of course, made the defendant liable for the tort of conversion, gov-
erned by a three years' statute of limitations. Apparently that stat-
ute had run, so the plaintiff sought to take advantage of the six
years' statute applicable to contract actions by suing for restitution,
to recover the value of the goods. Special Term held he could not do
so, and dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed,
and by a divided court held that the longer contract statute could be
invoked. The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. This, it is
submitted, was a desirable holding.
Perhaps, as interesting as the decision itself was the fairly short
opinion of the Appellate Division. Nowhere was the word "restitu-
tion" used. No reference was made to the Restatement of Restitution,
which appears to support the court's holding.8 "Plaintiff," said the
court, "apparently has waived the tort of conversion and is suing in
quasi-contract on the theory that he has ratified the transfer as if it
were a sale," citing Terry v. Munger,4 about which much has been
written (mostly critical) in law review articles and in the opinions of
courts of other states, and which has been repudiated by statute in
New York.
It is well settled that a person aggrieved by a tort committed
upon him may at his election sue in the alternative action for resti-
tution where the tortfeasor has been enriched by the tort." It is not
sufficient that a tort has been committed; it must further appear that
the tortfeasor has been enriched as a result.6 The mere "duty to pay
damages for a tort does not imply a promise to pay them."7 Resti-
tution will not lie for an assault and battery, since while the plaintiff
is injured, the defendant is not enriched. Similarly, restitution will
8 REsTATEr T, REST Ti"o § 524 (1937).
4 121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272 (1890).
5 REsTATEET, REsTrrTuTio § 3 (1937); Corbin, Waiver of Tort and Suit in
Assumpsit, 19 YAr= L. J. 221 (1910). Normally the action is for money, but jurisdic-
tion resides in equity to grant a restitutionary remedy by way of specific relief to
repair the defendant's tort, as where he tortiously withholds a unique chattel. See
Taliaferre v. Reirdon, 186 Okla. 603, 99 P. 2d 522 (1940); McGowin v. Renington,
12 Pa. 56, 51 Am. Dec. 584 (1849). For other cases see 1 PomERoy, EQu T JUars-
PRUDENCE, § 185 (5th ed., San Francisco and Rochester, 1942).
6 Reynolds Bros. v. Padgett, 94 Ga. 347, 21 S. E. 570 (1894); Greer v. Newland,
70 Kan. 315, 78 Pac. 835 (1904); Kyle v. Chester, 42 Mont. 552, 113 Pac. 749
(1911); RESTATEMENT, REsTioUT § 523 (1937).
7 Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888).
8 Bigby v. United States, 188 U. S. 400, 23 S. Ct. 468, 47 L. Ed. 519 (1903).
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not lie against a wrongdoer where a third party, not the wrongdoer
himself, received the benefit.'
I. "WAIVER" VERSUS ELECTION OF REMEDIES
THE court in the Cornelius case stated that the plaintiff "waived
the tort of conversion" when he sued for restitution. This is a com-
mon statement in judicial opinions. But it is clear that a party who
selects the alternative restitutionary remedy does not "waive" the
tort; the tort is the basis of the restitutionary remedy, and proof of
the commission of the tort is as necessary when such remedy is in-
voked as when action is brought in tort for damages.'0 Thus, an in-
fant, though not accountable for breach of contract, may be sued
for restitution for a tort. 1 When by statute a body execution is au-
thorized in actions "founded upon tort," it has been held that the
statute may be invoked in an alternative action for restitution for a
tort.'2
The view that the tort is "waived" has led to unfortunate de-
cisions in a variety of connections. It has been held, for example,
that when property is sold on credit, an action for restitution brought
to remedy the defendant's fraud in securing the sale may not be
brought until the credit period has expired; the election to sue for
restitution instead of for the tort is said to "waive" the fraud and
to "affirm" the sale and the period of credit attached to the sale.13
"Waiver" is one of the most confusing terms in our law, and
See also N. Y. Central R. Co. v. State, 242 App. Div. 421, 287 N. Y. S. 850 (3d
Dep't. 1936) (negligent damage to property).
9 Taylor v. Currey, 216 Ill. App. 19 (1919); Scherger v. Union National Bank,
138 Kan. 239, 25 Pac. 588 (1933); Ward v. Guthrie, 193 Ky. 76, 234 S. W. 955
(1921); Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 190 N. E. 102 (1934); National Trust Co. v.
Gleason, 77 N. Y. 400 (1879). See also Schall v. Gamors, 251 U. S. 239, 40 S. Ct.
135, 64 L. Ed. 247 (1919).
10 See RESTATFmENT, RESiTTUTION, Ch. 7, at 525 (1937); Albee v. Schmied, 250
Mich. 270, 230 N. W. 146 (1930). Elwell v. Martin, 32 Vt. 217 (1859).
11 Bristow v. Eastman, 1 Esp. 172 (1794).
12 Wheeler v. Wilkin, 98 Colo. 568, 58 P. 2d 1223 (1936).
'3 Kellogg v. Turpie, 93 Ill. 265 (1879); Prest v. Farmington, 117 Me. 348, 104
Atl. 521 (1918). But see American Woolen Co. v. Samuelson, 226 N. Y. 61, 123
N. E. 154 (1919); Stocksdale v. Schuyler, 55 Hun. 610, 8 N. Y. Supp. 813 (1890),
aff'd. 130 N. Y. 674, 29 N. E. 1034 (1891). The same faulty approach arises when it
said that a party to an executory bilateral contract containing mutually dependent prom-
ises may, where the contract is repudiated or materially breached, "waive" the breach
(or, what is a variant of the same underlying notion, "rescind" the contract) and sue
instead for restitution. When restitution is invoked in such circumstances, the breach
is as much the basis for the action as it is when the prayer is for damages. See
Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 110, 45 A. L. R. 1041 (1926).
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might well be discarded in favor of more specific terms which actually
describe the basis of decisions in various circumstances. Williston
has pointed out that in the law of contracts, the term "waiver" means
nine different things,14 and the Restatement of Contracts restricts its
use to cases of promissory estoppel, i.e., situations in which one party
changes his position in justified reliance on the acts or statements of
the other.' 5 As applied to election between alternative courses of
action, "waiver" is defined in the Restatement of Contracts as the
process "whereby a party who has a choice of several rights or reme-
dies, adopts one and thereby destroys all right to the others."' 6
A. Excessive Analogy to Contracts.-The erroneous approach
to restitution as an alternative remedy in tort cases derives not sim-
ply from the view that the tort is "waived" but also from the belief
that the remedy is truly contractual in character or creates a con-
tractual relation between the parties. As stated by the court in the
Cornelius case, "Plaintiff, therefore, apparently has waived the tort
of conversion and is suing in quasi contract on the theory that he has
ratified the transfer as though it were a sale" (italics supplied). Now
we all know that the goods were not sold. They were converted.
Why should we, then, persist in this approach simply because the
language in the common counts of assumpsit in pre-Code days were
framed to take advantage of one procedural category of liability in-
stead of another?
The quasi-contractual remedy was originally assimilated to the
action of assumpsit so as to permit use of the simple methods of
pleading available in assumpsit, and to afford the widest possible lati-
tude for development of the action." But the customarily repeated
statement that the aggrieved party "may waive the tort and sue in
assumpsit" should not be taken to mean that the restitutionary reme-
dy is contractual in character. The action of assumpsit was in its
origin based on tort,'" and some scholars contend that the require-
ment of consideration in the law of contracts at common law as a
detriment (i.e., injury) exchanged for a promise is traceable at
least partly to the tort origin of our law of contracts. At all events,
if for historical reasons the language of sale and delivery must be
14 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 679 (Rev. ed. 1936).
15 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 88 (1932).
16 Id. at § 297.
17 Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1 W. B1. 219 (1760).
18 Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv. 1, 53 (1887).
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used in a complaint supporting an action for restitution based on
a tort, it ought to be kept in mind that such language is a remedial
fiction.19 It should not be countenanced as a substantive fact.
A great deal of mischief has been worked by regarding the ac-
tion as contractual for all purposes. When the owner of land seeks
to resort to assumpsit against a trespasser it is said that he thereb r
elects to regard the defendant as a tenant, which has the effect of
foreclosing the assumpsit remedy because of the lack of an express
agreement establishing a landlord-tenant relationship. 0 When the al-
ternative remedy of restitution is resorted to for conversion where
property is stolen, it has been reasoned that the effect is to pass title
to the converter, hence no recovery may be had against a bona fide
purchaser from the thief. 1 So it is also held that an election to sue
in assumpsit for a tort works a ratification of the transaction (and
effects a sale of the chattel for example, in cases of conversion) so
as to preclude withdrawal of the suit and the bringing of an action
based on the tort.22 Because this fictitious sale is treated as though
it were really a fact, it is held that the statute of limitations, when
restitution is sought as an alternative remedy for fraud in the pur-
chase of goods, runs not from the time the tort action accrues (i.e.,
when the fraud was or should reasonably have been discovered) but
from the time when th6 goods were delivered and accepted. 23
The holding in Terry v. Munger,24 cited by the court in the Cor-
nelius case, is a good example of a wrong result caused by excessive
acceptance of the contract-identification. The defendants in that case
were joint-tortfeasors; they had detached and carried away from a
mill certain machinery belonging to the plaintiffs, who sued one of
them for restitution, i.e., he "waived the tort and sued in assumpsit"
for the value of the machinery. Apparently the plaintiffs recovered
19 At a later point in its opinion the Appellate Division in the Cornelius case
recognized that the language of sale in an action for restitution is fictitious.
20 See Preston v. Hawley, 101 N. Y. 586, 5 N. E. 770 (1886); Lamb v. Lamb,
146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26 (1895). This is the genesis of the doubtful decision in
City of New York v. Bee Line, Inc., 246 App. Div. 28, 284 N. Y. Supp. 452 (1st
Dep't. 1935), aff'd. 271 N. Y. 595, 3 N. E. 2d 202 (1936), where the plaintiff was
denied the right to sue for restitution to recover the reasonable value of the defend-
ant's use of city streets, the defendant having wrongfully operated its buses without a
franchise.
21 Jameson v. Beeler & Campbell Supply Co., 118 Kan. 760, 236 Pac. 247 (1925).
22 See State Bank of Kingman v. Braly's Estate, 139 Kan. 788, 33 P. 2d 141
(1934); Bolton Mines Co. v. Stokes, 82 Md. 50, 33 Atl. 491 (1895).
23 See American Woolen Co. v. Samuelson, 226 N. Y. 61, 123 N. E. 154 (1919).
24 121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272 (1890).
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a judgment which was not satisfied. Thereafter they sued the other
defendant in tort for conversion. The defendant urged that the plain-
tiffs had ratified the tort and had in effect treated the transaction as
a sale in the first action by suing in quasi, and could not now sue
the defendant in tort for conversion. The court agreed, stating:
"We have then the fact that the defendants in that action were sued
by the plaintiffs herein, upon an implied contract to pay the value
of the property taken by them, as upon a sale thereof by plaintiffs to
them. The plaintiffs having treated the title to the property as having
passed to the defendants in that suit by such sale, can the plaintiffs
now maintain an action against another person, who was not a party
to that action, to recover damages from him for. his alleged conver-
sion of the same property, which conversion is founded upon his par-
ticipation in the same acts which plaintiffs in the old suit have al-
ready treated as constituting a sale of the property? We think not."25
The same view was reinforced by the court in the following
language:
"The plaintiffs having by their former action, in effect, sold this very
property, it must follow that at the time of the commencement of
this one they had no cause of action for a conversion in existence
against the defendant herein. The transfer of the title did not depend
upon the plaintiffs recovering satisfaction in such action for the pur-
chase-price. It was their election to treat the transaction as a sale
which accomplished that result, and that election was proved by the
complaint already referred to."2
26
In other jurisdictions the rule in the same circumstances at com-
mon law is different; it is correctly perceived that the contract iden-
tification is designed to broaden, not to restrict, the availability of
the alternative restitutionary remedy; that to sue for restitution in
a tort case is to choose one of two or more available remedies for a
wrong, not to "waive" any rights.
In 1939 New York abolished the rule in Terry v. Munger by
enacting Section 112-c of the Civil Practice Act which provides as
follows:
"Actions in conversion and on contract; no election of remedies.
Where rights of action exist against several persons for the conversion
of property and upon an express or implied contract, the institution
or maintenance of an action against one of these persons, or the re-
25 Id. at 161, 24 N. E. at 272.
26 Id. at 168, 24 N. E. at 273.
27 See, for example, Huffman v. Hughlett, 11 Lea 549 (Tenn. 1883). For criti-
cisms of the decision in Terry v. Munger, supra, and cases in other states holding
to the same effect see 28 Y= L. J. 409; 14 Mnm. L. REV. 562.
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covery against one of them of a judgment which is unsatisfied, for
the conversion or upon the contract, shall not be deemed an election
of remedies which bars a subsequent action against the others either
for conversion or upon the contract." '28
What has been said up to this point may seem inconsistent,
for the holding in the Cornelius case is approved yet the contractual
character of the alternative restitutionary remedy in tort cases is de-
nied. It is not, however, the identification with contract which is
sought to be denied, but the identification with contract in all situa-
tions and for all purposes, even when the result is to deny a remedy
when the purpose in creating the quasi-contractual remedy was to
expand the field of available remedies to aggrieved persons.
The identification of quasi-contract with the remedy of assump-
sit was made to get away from the limiting rules governing traditional
forms of action which circumscribed the ability of the common law
to effectuate justice. In tort cases, for example, the remedy of resti-
tution was available to repair unjust enrichment where because of the
common law rules governing abatement of tort actions by the death
of either party no action ex delicto could be brought.29
The purpose was not to emancipate the restitutionary remedy
from one area of restrictions so it could be trapped in another. En-
larging the measure of justice was the grand design. The test, there-
fore, ought to be this: When resorted to as an alternative remedy
for a tort, the action for restitution should be identified with contract
only to the extent necessary to broaden the availability of the resti-
tutionary remedy, otherwise the tort basis of the remedy should be
applied.3"
28 Section 112-c is in some respects a special instance of a general result accom-
plished by § 112-a of the Civil Practice Act, also enacted in 1939, which provides
as follows: "Where rights of action exist against several persons, the institution or
maintenance of an action against one, or the recovery against one of a judgment
which is unsatisfied, shall not be deemed an election of remedies which bars an
action against the others." See N. Y. Law Revision Commission Report, Leg. Doc.
No. 65(F) (1939), indicating that the purpose of § 112-c was to repudiate the view,
expressed in Fowler v. Bowery Say. Bank, 113 N. Y. 450, 21 N. E. 172 (1889), that
an action against one party for wrongdoing based on so-called ratification does not
bar a later action against another wrongdoer based on so-called disaffirmance.
29 Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 22 S. Ct. 493, 46 L. Ed. 740 (1902); Ferrill v.
Mooney, 33 Tex. 219 (1870). Resort to the restitutionary remedy for this purpose
is unnecessary in New York today, since §§ 118 and 119 of its Decedent Estate Law
have abolished the common law rule which abated actions because of the death of
the person aggrieved or the person liable.
30 See Pink v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 274 N. Y. 167, 8 N. E. 2d 321
(1937); Miller v. City of Oneida, 153 Misc. 438, 275 N. Y. Supp. 157 (Sup. Ct. 4th
Dep't. 1934). Cf. Kittredge v. Grannis, 244 N. Y. 182, 155 N. E. 93 (1926).
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Restitution is a separate branch of the law. Its distinguishing
feature, one which sets it apart from other categories of legal lia-
bility, lies in its measure of recovery. The purpose is not to enforce
contracts nor to award damages but to prevent unjust enrichment.
It looks not to the plaintiff's damages but to the benefit which the
defendant obtained or retains and to which he is not entitled. For a
tort or material breach of contract by which the defendant is unjust-
ly enriched, restitution is an alternative remedy. In numberless
situations, (e.g., mistake, duress, innocent misrepresentation, many
cases of illegal transactions, contracts discharged by impossibility)
restitution is commonly the sole available remedy.,1
The contractual character of the restitutionary remedy in tort
cases has properly been applied to permit the assignability of claims,
in jurisdictions where tort claims are nonassignable, 2 . to allow the
revival of a barred claim by a new promise, 33 to authorize proof of
a claim in bankruptcy,3 4 to enable a party to secure a warrant of at-
tachment, 5 to broaden the availability of counterclaims.3 6
Where, however, greater justice would thereby be achieved the
alternative restitutionary remedy in tort cases is held to be non-con-
tractual in character. The question arises, for example, when a re-
ward is paid to one who wrongfully induces payment, when in fact
another is entitled to the reward. May the party entitled to the
reward sue the wrongful recipient for restitution, or is it a defense
that no "privity" exists to support the action? Older cases deny a
31 Examination of law texts for their coverage of restitution often yields inter-
esting results. For example, treatises on torts (including the Restatement of the law
of torts) commonly contain only cursory reference to the alternative remedy of resti-
tution for torts. By contrast, contract texts fully cover restitution as an alternative
remedy for material breach of contract. See, for example, 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS,
§§ 1102-1121 (St. Paul, 1951). Tort claims, except those to recover damages for per-
sonal injury, are assignable in New York, by virtue of N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY
LAW, § 41.
32 Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P. 2d 611 (1936).
33 Belcher v. Tacoma Eastern R. Co., 99 Wash. 34, 168 Pac. 782 (1917). Ap-
parently a barred tort claim which is not amenable to the alternative restitutionary
remedy may not be revived by a new promise in New York. See Reilly v. Sabater,
26 Civ. Proc. R. 34, 43 N. Y. Supp. 383 (1896). The Restatement of Contracts (§ 86)
does not appear to permit revival of tort obligations unless quasi-contractual reme-
dies are available.
34 Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U. S. 328, 55 S. Ct. 151, 79 L. Ed. 393
(1934); Reynolds v. New York Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611 (1st Cir. 1911).
35 McCall v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 527, 36 P. 2d 642 (1934).
36 See Manhattan Egg Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Terminal & Refrigeration Co., 137
Misc. 14, 242 N. Y. Supp. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't. 1929) (prior to 1936 amendment
of Civil Practice Act § 266, which now freely allows counterclaims).
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right of action by the party entitled to the reward against the recipi-
ent,87 but the greater number of more recent decisions are to the
contrary.8 -The same principle applies when restitution is allowed by
the rightful owner against a party who collects negotiable paper on a
forged indorsement.89
The inapplicability of contract provisions or principles to the
alternative action for restitution for torts is further brought out in
cases where payment is made by an insurance company on a fraudu-
lent overstatement of loss under a policy which provides that all
rights under the policy shall be forfeited for such fraudulent over-
statement. The insurance company might defend a suit by the in-
sured to recover the actual loss upon proof of the fraudulent over-
statement, but after the company has paid the overstated amount it
may not sue to recover any more than the excess, since the "action
for money had and received to the plaintiff's use is in no way founded
upon the contract of insurance, but upon the fact that false and
fraudulent representations were made by the defendants in order to
induce the plaintiff to pay the same."40
II. TYPES OF TORTS WHERE RESTITUTION IS
AVAILABLE
THE alternative remedy of restitution for a tort performs an im-
portant function because, as we have seen, it may be invoked in
situations where the tort action is unavailable 41 or has been barred, as
in the Cornelius case. In a variety of situations, moreover, the resti-
tutionary remedy allows a measure of recovery which may be more
beneficial to the aggrieved party. Proof of damages in tort may often
be difficult; at times they cannot be proved at all. Yet, through the
remedy of restitution, the wrongdoer is compelled to yield up his
unjust enrichment to the plaintiff. That the common law is thereby
able to broaden the ethical reach of its process may be indicated
by some of the types of tort situations where restitution has been
allowed.
8 7 Sergeant & Harris v. Stryker, 16 N. J. L. 464 (1838).
88 See Claxton v. Kay, 101 Ark. 350, 142 S. W. 517 (1912); Caskie v. Philadel-
phia Rapid Transit Co., 321 Pa. 157, 184 AUt. 17 (1936); Bosworth v. Wolfe, 146
Wash. 615, 264 Pac. 413 (1928).
89 Cf. Allen v. M. Mendelsohn & Son, 207 Ala. 527, 93 So. 416 (1922).
40 Western Assurance Co. v. Towle, 65 Wis. 247, 260, 26 N. W. 104, 110 (1886).
See also Schank v. Schuchman, 212 N. Y. 353, 100 N. E. 127 (1914).
41 See notes 32-36, supra.
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A. Appropriation of Another's Rights or Property.-One who
appropriates the property rights of another, such as trade names,
trade secrets, protected business ideas, trademarks, patents, profits a
prendre, or franchises, commits a tort in doing so, and the aggrieved
party may in the alternative compel the wrongdoer to yield up his
profits in an action for restitution.42 The remedy of restitution is
effective in such cases to repair unjust enrichment; the tort remedy
is often ineffective because little actual damage is done to the plain-
tiff's property or property rights.
4 3
Some doubt has been expressed whether an action at law for
restitution may be had for wrongful use of a patent, upon the ground
that the statutory remedies of an action for damages and a suit for
injunction are exclusive,44 but it would seem more logical to hold
that the statute supplements rather than supplants the existing field
of general common law remedies.45 There is no reason why the gen-
eral rule permitting actions for restitution in cases of tortious inter-
ference with business advantages should not apply to patent infringe-
ments 4 6 and this appears to be the view adopted by the Restatement
of Restitution .4  At all events the equivalent of restitution may be
secured in an injunction suit where the patent is still alive, since
the infringer's profits are recoverable in such suit.
48
One who wrongfully acquires property from another to which a
third person is entitled may be sued for restitution by the party en-
titled to it.49 This proposition is applied in a variety of situations, in-
cluding cases in which, while the acquisition is wrongful, it does not
necessarily constitute an actionable tort.5" If, for example, Jones
knows that Smith is indebted to Black, not Jones, but secures pay-
ment of the debt to himself, he may be compelled to make restitution
42 RESTATEMNT, RESTrrTUTON § 136 (1937); Ryan & Associates v. Century Brew-
ing Assn., 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053 (1936).
43 See RESTATEmENT, RES TrS oN § 136, Comment a (1937).
44 In re Paramount Public Corp., 8 F. Supp. 644 (S. D. N. Y. 1934).
46 See Schiff v. Hammond Clock Co., 69 F. 2d 742 (7th Cir. 1934).
46 See KEar, QUAsi CONTRACTS 165 (New York, 1893); WOODWARD, QUASI CoN-
mTAcs § 288 (Boston, 1913).
47 RESTATEiENT, RTsnT nON § 136, Comment a (1937). See Eckert v. Braun,
155 F. 2d 517 (7th Cir. 1946).
48 See Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U. S. 448, 52 S. Ct. 238,
76 L. Ed. 389 (1932).
49 RESTATEMENT, REsTITUTIoN § 133 (1937).
50 See Heywood v. Northern Assurance Co., 133 Minn. 360, 158 N. W. 632
(1916); cf. Armstrong v. Blackwood, 227 Ala. 545, 151 So. 602 (1933).
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to Smith.5 Similarly, if Jones, knowing that Smith is entitled to a
reward by fraud or other wrongful conduct secures payment of the
reward to himself, Smith may sue Jones in restitution to recover the
reward.
52
The foregoing instances express the general principle that a party
who makes a profit at the expense of another may be compelled to
surrender it in an action for restitution.53 It is not too clear, how-
ever, that the present state of the law goes so far. When the breach
of a contract is tortiously induced, for example, there is hesitation at
times to allow recovery of the wrongdoer's profit. The aggrieved
party is limited to a tort action for damages. Where a servant is
tortiously enticed to leave his master, an early English case indicates
that an action for restitution will lie,54 though it has been contended
that a tort action is the sole remedy unless force is used to accom-
plish the enticement." There seems no logical reason to deny the
restitutionary remedy when the breach of a contract is induced, even
when the tort lies solely in the inducement and is not accompanied
by other wrongdoing such as fraud or duress.55 The alternative reme-
dy of restitution has been allowed in many cases.
57
To the extent that the disinclination to allow restitution is based
on a view that interference with contract rights has an inferior status
to comparable interference with rights in property,58 the denial of
restitution seems plainly to be unjustified. Certainly the remedy of
restitution should not be denied simply because it is not the kind
51 See Heywood v. Northern Assurance Co., 133 Minn. 360, 158 N. W. 632
(1916); Caskie v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321 Pa. 157, 184 Atl. 17 (1936).
52 See Seastrand v. Foley & Co., 144 Minn. 239, 175 N. W. 117 (1919).
53 See Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 226 Ala. 142, 145 So. 651
(1932); McArthur v. Murphy, 74 Minn. 53, 76 N. W. 955 (1928).
54 Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt 112 (1808).
55 WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 285 (Boston, 1913). Doubt regarding the cor-
rectness of the Lightly and Foster cases is also expressed in JAcXsoN, HISTORY OF
QUASI CONTRACT IN ENcLIsH LAW 80 (Cambridge, 1936); WINFIELD, TIE PROVINCE
or THE LAW OF TORT 174-175 (Cambridge, 1931) (reason for doubt itself doubtful,
since based on the view that alternative remedy of restitution in tort cases has been,
and therefore presumably should be, limited to count for money had and received).
56 Cf. Caskie v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 321 Pa. 157, 184 At. 17 (1936)
(breach of contract induced by fraud).
57 Second National Bank v. M. Samuel & Sons, Inc., 12 F. 2d 963 (1926),
cert. den. 273 U. S. 720, 47 S. Ct. 110, 71 L. Ed. 857 (1927). The measure of recov-
ery is not the profit which the plaintiff would have made had he performed the con-
tract but the profit which the defendant reaped by inducing its breach, even though
this be greater than the plaintiff's profit. See Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. U. S. Sugar
Equalization Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
58 Cf. Ryan & Associates v. Century Brewing Assn., 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d
1053 (1936).
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of case in which the remedy has customarily been granted in the
past-"The whole trend of the law points to the aspiration of the
courts to find an adequate and orderly remedy for wrongs as to
which redress was elusive until this theory of quasi contracts was
developed."5 9 Possibly, however, the hesitation to extend the remedy
of restitution to cases involving inducements to breach contracts de-
rives from the view that the wrongdoer's profit is normally attributa-
ble in part to his own efforts. The Restatement of Restitution de-
clines to take a position as to the availability of restitution in such
cases.
60
B. Wrongful Securing or Appropriation of Services.-Restitu-
tion may be had where, through tortious action (such as false im-
prisonment, duress or fraud), services of another are secured." If
the jailer or the applicable division of government receives money
from the contractor for the services of a person unlawfully im-
prisoned, restitution may be had for the amount received. 2 Thus, one
may be compelled to make restitution for services tortiously secured
from a wife, or from an unemancipated child without the parent's
consent.(3 It is not a defense, nor a ground for mitigating liability,
that wages were paid to the child,64 but the value of necessaries fur-
nished the child may be deducted. 5
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty.-A fiduciary who by breach of
duty acquires a benefit, commits a tort and the beneficiary may in
the alternative sue the fiduciary for restitution. Thus, if an agent
through disloyalty or breach of his fiduciary duties makes a profit,
he may be compelled to yield it up to the principal in an action for
restitution.
7
59 Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. U. S. Equalization Board, 268 Fed. 575 (S. D. N. Y.
1920).
60 RESTATIZEENT, RESTiTuT-oN § 133, Comment c (1937).
61 REsTATEmENT, REsTI=TIoN § 134 (1937). See, for example, Patterson v. Craw-
ford, 12 Ind. 241 (1859), where a contractor of prison labor who used compulsion
upon those entrusted to his care was compelled to make restitution to one wrong-
fully imprisoned.
62 See RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION § 134(2) (1937).
63 RESTArmENT, RESrIusIooN § 135 (1937); Smith v. Gilbert, 80 Ark. 525, 98
S. W. 115 (1906); Smith v. Smith, 30 Conn. 111 (1860); Culbertson v. Alabama
Const. Co., 127 Ga. 599, 56 S. E. 765 (1907).
64 See White v. Henry, 24 Me. 531 (1845); Dunn v. Altman, 50 Mo. App. 231
(1892).
65 See Culbertson v. Alabama Construction Co., 127 Ga. 591, 56 S. E. 765 (1907).
66 REsTATEmENT, REsTIuoN § 138(1) (1937).
67 Schmidt v. Wallinger, 125 Va. 361, 99 S. E. 680 (1919). See Wechsler v. Bow-
man, 285 N. Y. 284, 34 N. E. 2d 322 (1941) ; Seavey, Problems in Restitution, 7 OLA.
L. RFv. 257, 259 (1954).
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If a third person tortiously colludes with the disloyal fiduciary
and thereby obtains a benefit, the beneficiary may alternatively sue
the third person for restitution.68 Thus, if the third person bribes the
agent to secure the principal's business and adds the amount of the
bribe to the charge made to the principal, he may recover the over-
charge in an action for restitution.69
D. Wrongful Creating of Liability Against Another.-It often
happens that a party is empowered, by virtue of his relation to an-
other, to impose liability upon him toward a third person even though
the party imposing such liability has no right to do so. The law of
agency abounds with such situations. Thus a general agent may bind
his principal to a contract with a third person in violation of special
instructions. An agent may exercise an apparent authority with the
same effect, though his actual authority may give him no right to do
the act or make the contract in question. A servant acting outside
the scope of his authority may obligate his master to a third party
in tort by application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
In these and comparable situations the act of the party impos-
ing liability, though done in the exercise of a power flowing from the
relationship, is tortious and may also constitute a breach of contract
if the matter was contractually covered by the parties to the relation-
ship.70 Whether or not it is also a breach of contract, the principal
or other person may resort to the alternative remedy of restitution
against the agent or other person who tortiously created the liability
to the third partyY-
E. Wrongful Destruction of Property Interests.-The wrongful
exercise of a power which exists by virtue of a relationship may give
rise not only to the creation of a liability against another, as dis-
cussed above, but also to the destruction of property interests. An
example as to chattels is the case of an agent to pledge who sells the
chattels instead, under circumstances where because of the agent's
ostensible authority title passes to the vendee. The relationship need
not be fiduciary in character. A second assignee of a claim who has
knowledge of the first assignment, for example, who nevertheless col-
lects the claim from an innocent debtor thereby extinguishing it is
68 RESTATEuxENT, RESTTUTION § 138(2) (1937).
69 Schank v. Schuchman, 212 N. Y. 352, 106 N. E. 127 (1914).
70 See RBSTATEmENT, AGENCY §§ 400-401 (1933).
71 RESTATEm'ENT, RESTITurON § 132 (1937).
[VOL. 2
RESTITUTION AS ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
an illustration. In all such cases the party whose property interest
has been tortiously destroyed may in the alternative secure restitu-
tion from the wrongdoer. 2
A subsequent assignee of rents who collects them has been com-
pelled to make restitution, under the principle stated in this section,
to a mortgagee of the realty who, by the mortgage agreement, was
entitled to the rents after the mortgagor's default.7"
F. Fraud and Deceit.-One of the most common situations in
which the remedy of restitution is invoked is where property or a
property right is secured by fraud or duress. Since the prevailing
view does not as yet seem to regard duress as an independent tort,74
restitution is the sole remedy to recover the value of property ob-
tained by duress. As regards misrepresentation, restitution may be
the sole remedy or an alternative remedy depending on the circum-
stances.
One who is induced by misrepresentation to enter into a con-
tract may, while the contract is wholly executory, have a complete
defense to the other party's action to enforce it. In addition, in juris-
dictions (such as New York) providing such a remedy, he may sue
for a declaratory judgment that the contract is a nullity.75
If there was mistake by the person to whom the misrepresenta-
tion was made, and as a result the agreement fails to express what
both parties intended, reformation may be had.76  The mere fact
of misrepresentation, however, is not sufficient, since the purpose of
reformation is to establish the agreement which the parties in fact
made but imperfectly expressed, not to establish an agreement which
the parties should have or would supposedly have made if they were
aware of all the facts. When reformation is not possible, nullification
(rescission) is the sole remedy.
77
Neither where reformation nor rescission is sought, is it neces-
sary that the misrepresentation be willful, i.e., that it be sufficient to
72 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 131 (1937); McArthur v. Murphy, 74 Minn. 53,
76 N. W. 955 (1928).
78 Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 226 Ala. 142, 145 So. 651 (1932).
74 Cf. PRossER, TORTS 85-86 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1955). Dissatisfaction with the
,view that duress is not- tort is evidenced in RESTATE,=NT, TORTS § 871 (1939), which
takes the view that a tort action lies for duress where property interests are inter-
fered with.
75 WILIISTONT, CONTRACTS § 525 (Rev. ed. New York, 1936).
76 RESTAT=rET, CONTRACTS §§ 491, 505 (1934).
77 Russel v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 66 F. 2d 864 (loth Cir. 1933).
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predicate an action in tort for fraud and deceit. Innocent misrepre-
sentation, provided it is material, is sufficient. 7
The innocent party may, if the contract is wholly executory and
he has done nothing in performance of it, sue the other party for
damages. If the misrepresentation was willful, his action could be in
tort for fraud and deceit, if innocent the action would have to be
for breach of warranty where the transaction is of a kind that raises
a warranty (such as a sale of goods). In either event the measure
of damages would be the difference between the value of the imper-
fect performance and the promised performance. 70
In a number of jurisdictions, however, including New York, a
less favorable measure of damages is provided for tort actions in
fraud and deceit; the innocent party is given not the benefit of the
bargain but the right simply to be restored to his original position.
In other words, if X sells a watch to Y fraudulently representing that
it is made of gold when in fact it is made of silver, Y would not have
a cause of action under the view to recover damages in tort if the
watch were worth what Y paid for it despite the misrepresentation.
If the contract is wholly executory this would mean that no damages
would be recoverable."0 In such jurisdictions the tort measure of
damages is similar'to that applied to actions for restitution. If, there-
fore, an action for breach of contract or warranty also exists in the
particular case, it may be advantageous to sue upon this theory, as
damages would be measured by the lost advantage contemplated by
the contract. Notwithstanding that damages may not be recovered,
however, rescission may be secured.8'
If the innocent party has parted with something of value, he may
sue at law to recover its value, or he may petition equity to secure
it back if land or a unique chattel is involved. 2 In the case, then,
where a party is induced to make a contract which is not performed
according to its terms by reason of the defendant's tortious fraud and
78 Dale v. Roosevelt, S Johns. Ch. 174 (N. Y. 1821); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 470(1) (1934); RESTATENT, REsTiTuToN § 28 (1937).
79 Seimer v. Dickinson Farm Mtge. Co., 299 Fed. 651 (E. D. Il. 1924), aff'd. 12
F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1926), cert. den. 273 U. S. 700, 49 S. Ct. 95, 71 L. Ed. 847
(1926).
80 Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125, 10 S. Ct. 39, 33 L. Ed. 279 (1889); Reno v.
Bull, 226 N. Y. 546, 124 N. E. 144 (1919).
81 Brett v. Cooney, 75 Conn. 338, 53 AtI. 729 (1902); RFSTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 476 (1934).
82 Heilbronn v. Herzog, 165 N. Y. 98, 58 N. E. 759 (1900); RESTATEMENT, RESI-
TUTIoN § 130, Comment a (1937).
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deceit, the plaintiff has at least three alternative remedies: (1) a tort
action; (2) an action for damages for breach of contract; (3) an
action for restitution, based on rescission, to recover benefits con-
ferred on the defendant in performance of the contract. 83 The com-
mon law also affords a defrauded buyer the right to recover the price
he paid for the goods and permits recovery of the property through
an action of trover (conversion) or replevin. In addition, the de-
frauded or innocent party may, after rescinding the transaction and
restoring whatever benefits he received under it from the other party,
sue him in tort for conversion.84
The innocent party may, however, elect to disaffirm the trans-
action and to sue in restitution for return of the benefit conferred
on the guilty party. In other words, he may "waive" the torts of
fraud and deceit or conversion, or the contract right to sue for dama-
ges for breach of warranty, and sue for restitution to secure not
the price of the goods sold (or other benefit conferred) but its value
to the guilty party.85
Suit for restitution as an alternative to a tort action is permitted
in cases of fraud or misrepresentation not only where contracts are
involved, but in other cases. In general, if X makes a fraudulent rep-
resentation to Y as a result of which Y confers a benefit upon X, Y
may sue the other in tort for fraud and deceit or for restitution to
recover the value of benefit. Where, however, X's misrepresentation
is innocently made, Ys sole remedy would be for restitution.86
G. Conversion.-An action for restitution as an alternative for
the tort of conversion both of chattels and money and irrespective
of the innocence of the converter is universally recognized; 7 though
a number of limitations exist as to the circumstances in which the al-
ternative remedy of restitution may be invoked.
Unless title is in dispute, conversion of property held by tenants
in common, as where one of the tenants sells trees grown on the land
83 See Bijard v. Holmes, 33 N. J. L. 119 (1857).
84 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 128 (1932).
85 Casserly v. Orrick (Mo. App.) 536; Crown Cycle Co. v. Brown, 39 Ore. 285,
64 Pac. 451 (1901); RESTAT MENT, RESTITUTION § 28, 134 (1937). The New York
statute allowing damages in an action for rescission (Civil Practice Act, § 112e) does
not, it seems, contemplate the situation described in this paragraph of the text, but
has to do with cases such as those in which a party desires to return goods which
he has a right to reject, and sue for damages for failure to deliver the right kind of
goods. See 1941 Report of the Law Revision Commission 285.
86 See RESTATEMENT, R STITUTION § 28 (1937).
87 Id. at § 128.
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without the consent of the other tenant, is held to give rise to an
action for restitution by the aggrieved tenant.88 An alternative action
for restitution may be brought for conversion not only against the
original wrongdoer, but against one who acquires from him by pur-
chase of the converted property. 9 If a thief transfers money or ne-
gotiable instruments to a third party other than a bona fide purchaser,
the owner may secure restitution against the third party.90
The alternative remedy of restitution is available where money
or property is obtained by fraudulent means.91 If the defendant was
entitled to something but by fraud secured more, only the excess may
be recovered .
2
In cases of conversion as in the law of restitution generally,
when the restitutionary remedy is invoked the measure of recovery
is not the plaintiff's loss but the benefit received by the defendant. 3
What may perhaps be regarded as a deviation from this principle,
though explainable on logical grounds, are the cases which hold that
one who innocently buys a chattel from a thief (and thereby becomes
liable for conversion) may be held in restitution for its value, without
deduction of the purchase price paid to the thief. 
4
The tort of conversion is committed where (1) property is
wrongfully damaged or destroyed; (2) property is wrongfully taken,
retained or used. In the first type of case restitution is not available
unless the destruction takes place while the converter is in possession
of the property. 9 The aggrieved party is limited to a tort action be-
88 Lufkin v. Daves, 220 Ala. 443, 125 So. 811 (1930).
89 See Dentists Supply Co. of New York v. Cornelius, 281 App. Div. 306, 119
N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1st Dep't. 1953), aff'd. 306 N. Y. 624, 116 N. E. 2d 238 (1953).
90 Arkansas Nat. Bank v. Martin, 110 Ark. 578, 163 S. W. 795 (1914); Arm-
strong v. Kubo & Co., 88 Cal. App. 331, 263 Pac. 365 (1928).
91 RESTATEmET, RESrTUTiO N § 128, Comment d (1937); Maxherman Co. v.
Alger, 210 App. Div. 389, 206 N. Y. Supp. 233 (1st Dep't. 1924).
92 See Schank v. Schuchman, 212 N. Y. 352, 106 N. Y. 127 (1914).
93 See Catts v. Morris, 2 How 376, 11 L. Ed. 306 (1884); Corey v. Struve,
170 Cal. 170, 14 Pac. 48 (1915); RESTATENT, RESTITUTION § 128, Comment f (1937).
94 RESTATEMENT, RESTITU"ION § 128, Comments f, k (1937); McGoldrick v. Wil-
lits, 52 N. Y. 612 (1873); Sage v. Shepard & Morse Lumber Co., 4 App. Div. 290,
39 N. Y. Supp. 449 (3d Dep't. 1896), aff'd. 158 N. Y. 672, 52 N. E. 1126 (1899);
Manhattan Egg Co. v. Seaboard T. & R. Co., 137 Misc. 14, 242 N. Y. Supp. 189
(Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't. 1929). The contrary holding in Soderlin v. Marquette National
Bank of Minneapolis, 214 Minn. 408, 8 N. W. 2d 331 (1943), which is opposed to
the prevailing view, is criticized in Note, 27 Mum. L. REV. 583 (1943), but in Thurs-
ton, Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45 Micni. L. REv. 935 (1947),
it is stated (at p. 946): "As an original question there is much to be said for this
conclusion . . .".
95 RESTATEMENT, RESITUTION § 154, Comment a (1937).
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cause, while the plaintiff has been damaged, the defendant has not
been enriched.9" Restitution will not lie for negligent damage or de-
struction of property.
97
The second type of case, i.e., where the property is wrongfully
taken, retained or used, is in turn capable of a two-fold division:
(a) where the wrongdoer retains the property, i.e., does not sell it;
(b) where he sells the converted property. A number of decisions
hold that restitution is inappropriate to the first of these cases, reason-
ing that "waiver of tort" in conversion cases may be resorted to only
under the count of money had and received. 98 The greater number of
jurisdictions, however, including New York and approved by the Re-
statement of Restitution,99 hold that restitution may be had in both
types of cases.1"' Thus it is held that one who (though innocently)
purchases property from a thief or from one who had no legal or
equitable right to property, may be held liable not only in tort for
its conversion but in restitution for its value."' The same rule ap-
plies where property is purchased from an unauthorized agent. 0 2
Where the action for money had and received is based on the
wrongful sale of converted property, a further refinement is made in
some cases to the effect that it must be shown the defendant has
received money in exchange for his property; the mere sale by way
of exchange is insufficient, 0 3 unless the exchanged goods are received
90 Ward v. Guthrie, 193 Ky. 76, 234 S. W. 955 (1921); Reynolds v. Padgett,
94 Ga. 347, 21 S. E. 570 (1874); RESTATFMNT, REsTiTUTIoN § 128, Comments c, e
(1937).
97 Reynolds Bros. v. Padgett, 94 Ga. 347, 21 S. E. 570 (1894). See supra,
notes 6-9.
98 See Ford & Co. v. Atlantic Compress Co., 138 Ga. -496, 75 S. E. 609 (1912).
As a means of circumventing the rule allowing the alternative remedy of assumpsit
only under the count of money had and received, it was held in early English cases
that if the defendant was unable to produce the property he presumably sold it for
value, thereby permitting the plaintiff to recover. See Longchamp v. Kenny, 1 Doug.
329 (1779); Hunter v. Walsh, I Stark 224 (1816).
99 § 128, Comment h (1937).
100 Heinze v. McKinnon, 205 Fed. 366 (1913); Roberts v. Evans, 43 Cal. 380
(1872); Abbott v. Blossom, 66 Barb. 353 (N. Y. 1873) (where wrongdoer has changed
condition and character of property); Harman v. Loscalzo, 125 N. Y. S. 517 (App.
Term 1st Dep't. 1910); Manhattan Egg Co. v. Seaboard Terminal Etc. Co., 137 Misc.
14, 242 N. Y. Supp. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1st Dep't. 1929).
101 RESTATEumNT, REsTITuTIoN § 128, Comment f (1937); Manhattan Egg Co.,
Inc. v. Seaboard Terminal & Refrigeration Co., 137 Misc. 14, 242 N. Y. Supp. 189
ZSup. Ct. 1st Dep't. 1929); Crown Cycle Co. v. Brown, 39 Ore. 285, 64 Pac. 451
(1901); Huffman v. Hughlett, 11 Lea 549 (1883).
102 Sage v. Shepard & Morse Lumber Co., 4 App. Div. 290, 39 N. Y. Supp. 444
(3d Dep't. 1896), affd'. 158 N. Y. 672, 52 N. E. 1126 (1899).
1o3 Fuller v. Duren, 36 Ala. 73 (1860); Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285 (Mass. 1827);
Kidney v. Person, 41 Vt. 386 (1868).
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as money's worth. 1°4 The prevailing rule and the law in New York,
however, is to the contrary.105 Still a further refinement is made
where the converted property is rightfully acquired, as where it is se-
cured by virtue of a contract. In such cases (e.g., wrongful sale of
property by a pledgee) even those courts which insist upon evidence
of a sale of the property hold that restitution will lie for the conver-
sion though the property has not been sold.106
The prevailing view is that an action for restitution will lie for
the wrongful use of personal property.10 7 The contrary is held in
some cases, in large part influenced by the view that assumpsit does
not lie for conversion unless the converter has sold the property or
exchanged it for property of fixed value. 08 The measure of recovery
when restitution for use is permitted is the actual value of the use,
but not less than the reasonable rental value whether or not the chat-
tel was actually used.10 9
Conversion is a species of absolute liability; innocence of the
defendant, whether through mistake or otherwise, does not prevent
operation of the forced-sale characteristic of the tort, by virtue of
which he is deemed to have bought the property, hence liable for
its full value to the plaintiff."0 The Restatement of Torts,"' in
disagreement with the prevailing rule, adopts the view that one who
innocently becomes liable for conversion, as where he unknowingly
purchases goods from a thief, should have a right to return the goods
in mitigation of damages. New York is one of a few states which
go so far as to hold in such cases that the plaintiff's cause of action
does not accrue without prior demand for return of the goods; the
defendant, in other words, has the right to return the goods and be
104 Burton Lumber Co. v. Wilder, 108 Ala. 669, 18 So. 552 (1895); Whitewell v.
Vincent, 4 Pick. 449 (Mass. 1827).
105 Terry v. Munger, 121 N. Y. 161, 24 N. E. 272 (1890); RESTATEMENT, RESTI-
TUTION § 128, Comment k (1937).
106 Bell v. Bank of California, 153 Cal. 234, 94 Pac. 889 (1908); Tennessee
Chemical Co. v. George, 161 Ga. 563, 131 S. E. 493 (1925).
107 McSorley v. Faulkner, 18 N. Y. Supp. 460 (Com. Pls. N. Y. Co. 1892);
Philadelphia Co. v. Pork Brothers, 138 Pa. St. Rep. 346 (restitution for profits de-
rived from use of converted machine). RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (§ 128, Comment i)
is in accord.
108 See Carson Riv. Lumbering Co. v. Bassett, 2 Nev. 249 (1866). See also Lloyd
v. Fox, 1 E. D. Smith 101 (N. Y. 1850).
109 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 128, Comment k (1937).
110 BURDICK, TORTS 425 (Albany, 1926); PRoSsFR, TORTS 77-78 (2d ed. St. Paul,
1955).
111 § 247 (1932).
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free of liability for their conversion." 2 In all cases, of course, the
plaintiff would have a right to sue in restitution for the reasonable
value of the use of the goods."13
The measure of restitution for conversion is at least the value
of the converted property" 4 as of the time of the conversion."15
Accordingly, if the conversion involves a wrongful taking, the time of
taking measures the recoverable value, while if the taking was lawful
but the conversion lies in tortious detention, the time of detention
controls in measuring the value.:"6
If the conversion was willful and the property is of fluctuating
value, the aggrieved party is entitled to the highest value which the
property (e.g., stock) would have been worth when he probably would
have sold it.1 7 In the case of property secured by fraud, this time
is calculated as of a reasonable period after the property is trans-
ferred."18 Where conversion is by unauthorized taking or detention,
as where a pledgee sells or repledges a pawn, the aggrieved party is
entitled to recover the highest intermediate value between the date
upon which he gained notice of the conversion and a reasonable time
thereafter. 119 Enhancement of recovery in the case of property having
fluctuating value is denied where the conversion was innocent.1
20
It has been held in some cases that where the converter sells the
112 Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N. Y. 28 (1874). This does not detract from the absolute
character of tort liability for conversion, since demand is not necessary and the plain-
tiff may sue immediately where the defendant loses or sells the goods or they are
damaged or destroyed. See Pease v. Smith, 61 N. Y. 477 (1875).
113 See RESTATEMENT, REsTiruTIoN § 128, Comment g (1937).
114 Davidson Grocery Co. v. Johnston, 24 Ida. 336, 133 Pac. 929 (1913); Bowen
v. Detroit United Ry., 212 Mich. 432, 180 N. W. 495 (1920). Notwithstanding that
the defendant is innocent, he may not secure a reduction in the recovery because he could
obtain the material at a lower price under a contract with a third party. Galvin v.
Mac M. & M. Co., 14 Mont. 508, 37 Pac. 366 (1894). "The fact that the property
converted was of little or no benefit to the converter,- or that it was destroyed with-
out benefit to him is immaterial." RESTATE ENT, RESTITUTiON § 128, Comment a
(1937).
115 Felder v. Reeth, 34 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929); Moore v. Richardson, 68
N. J. L. 305, 53 Atl. 1032 (1903); Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211 (1873); First Nat.
Bk. v. Bailey, 97 W. Va. 19, 125 S. E. 357 (1924).
116 RESTATEwmNT, RESTITUTION § 151, Comment e (1937).
117 Id. at § 151, Comment c.
118 Id. at § 151, Illustration 3.
110 Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211 (1873); Hall v. Bache, 235 App. Div. 256, 256
N. Y. Supp. 693 (1st Dep't. 1932); Wright v. Bank of the Metropolis, 110 N. Y. 237,
18 N. E. 79, 1 L. R. A. 289, 6 Am. St. Rep. 356 (1888); Newton v. Wade, 264 N. Y.
632, 191 N. E. 600 (1934).
120 RESTATEMENT, RESTiTuTioN § 154, Comment a (1937); Jamison v. Moon, 43
Miss. 598 (1870).
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property he may be held liable in an action for restitution only for
the proceeds of the sale." 1 These cases derive in part from the older
view that the alternative assumpsit remedy for torts may be brought
only under the count for money had and received, partly also from
the error of treating the converter as the agent of the owner, i.e., from
the mistaken view that the tort is "waived", the transaction is rati-
fied and the converted goods sold.122 In principle such decisions are
indefensible and the Restatement of Restitution has adopted what is
believed to be the prevailing rule today.
If the converted goods or chattels have been incorporated into
property owned by the converter or were exchanged for other prop-
erty the owner may have an equitable lien on the property into
which they were incorporated or for which they were exchanged, and
at least where the conversion was willful or at all events not innocent
the owner may enforce a constructive trust against the property re-
ceived in exchange. 1
3
III. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
STATUTE S of limitations governing torts are commonly shorter
than those governing contracts. If the contract statute is held to gov-
ern the alternative action of restitution for a tort, the advantage of a
longer statute of limitations may accrue to the plaintiff. Keener as-
sumed without much discussion that the assumpsit (i.e., contract)
statute controls, not the shorter tort statute. 24 Woodward took the
opposite view, reasoning that the obligation to make restitution is not
a "primary" one, as where money or property is conferred by mistake,
but "a secondary one, arising, like the obligation to pay damages,
upon the breach of the primary obligation not to commit the
tort .... ," Under this view the statute of limitations in tort cases
would be that governing torts, and the contract statute where resti-
tution is invoked as an alternative remedy for material breach of
contract. 20 In the other branches of the law of restitution, e.g., where
121 Heinze v. McKinnon, 205 Fed. 367 (2d Cir. 1913); In re Baker, 35 Del.
198, 162 At. 356 (1932); Seavey v. Dana, 61 N. H. 339 (1881).
122 Cf. Felder v. Reeth, 34 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1929).
123 See RESTATEmENT, RESTiTUTioN § 128, Comment L (1937); Newton v. Porter,
69 N. Y. 133 (1877); American S. R. Co. v. Fancher, 145 N. Y. 552, 40 N. E. 206
(1895); Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. E. 261, 91 N. E. 582 (1910); Edwards v. Cul-
bertson, 111 N. C. 342, 16 S. E. 233 (1892); Peoples Nat. Bk. v. Waggoner, 185 N. C.
297, 117 S. E. 6 (1923); Preston v. Moore, 133 Tenn. 247, 180 S. W. 320 (1915).
124 KEEER, QUASI CONTRACTS 175 (New York, 1893).
125 WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 294 (Boston, 1913).
126 Id. at § 267.
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benefits are conferred by mistake, Woodward seems to concede that
the contractual statute would apply." 7
The Woodward view is justified on the surface by the fact that
in tort cases the alternative remedy of restitution, like the action for
damages, is predicated not on "waiver" of the tort but upon its
commission; the tort must be proved when either remedy is invoked.
But does this view survive scrutiny? It is believed not, since it
ignores the fundamental character of the action for restitution, whose
purpose is to repair an unjust enrichment. The defendant is asked
not to pay damage but to yield up a benefit inequitably secured or
retained. Historically the action to effectuate this purpose has been
regarded as contractual in nature, and whatever the source of the
action, whether arising out of a mistake or fraud or the commission
of a tort, the contract statute of limitations should be held to apply.
This is the view adopted by the Restatement of Restitution, 128 and
seems to be the prevailing rule.129
In the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent, it is
submitted that a statute of limitations for a tort should be construed
as applying to an action for damages, .not an action for restitution.
The very creation of the alternative remedy of restitution in tort
cases was intended to get away from tle rules of law governing ac-
tions for damages for tort (e.g., abatement of action upon death of
the wrongdoer), and this historical background should be given rec-
ognition because it is consonant with the requirements of justice; tort
statutes of limitations are made shorter than those governing contract
actions for a variety of reasons, of course, but one of them has to do
with a desire to dispose of damage actions more expeditiously than
other actions. This reason does not necessarily apply to cases in
which a remedy is sought for unjust enrichment.
While it seems fair, therefore, to invoke the contract statute to'
actions for restitution based on a tort, some doubt may be had with
the manner in which the contract statute is applied in some cases.
127 Id. at § 33.
128 See REsTATEMENT, REsTrruTIoN § 5; Introductory Note to Chapter 7 (1937).
129 See Lipman, Wolfe & Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 258 Fed. 544 (9th Cir.
1919); Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922); Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick.
133 (Mass. 1828); Liberty Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 172 Okla. 103, 44 P. 2d 127 (1935).
"Ordinarily the statutory period for a quasi-contractual cause of action is the same
as for a cause of action based upon an oral contract." RESTATEmENT, REsTrruToIO
§ 148, Comment f (1937).
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Woodward did not like these applications, and apparently was led
as a result to question the basic propriety of the tort statute in all
cases.130 Suppose a chattel is converted on one date, and later sold,
which date determines the tolling of the statute? It has been held
that the count of quantum valebat starts to run upon the conversion
date, whereas the count for money had and received does not begin
to run until the later date when the chattel is sold. 113 If, however,
the chattel is not sold until after the tort statute of limitations for
the conversion has run, no action for money had and received accrues
because of the sale.
132
Keener thought the Miller case was correctly decided and antici-
pated with approval the holding in the Currier case.13 There is ground
for urging that the Miller decision is of doubtful utility, but that if
the Miller case is right the Currier decision is wrong. As to the Miller
case, it would seem fair to urge that the common counts should be
regarded as merely descriptive of a single cause of action in assump-
sit, not a vehicle for creating new causes of action. The tort was com-
mitted when the chattel was converted, and what was done thereafter
should not be held to create a new cause of action. A partial clue
to the rationale of the Miller case may perhaps be found in the un-
willingness of the courts, particularly in the early cases, to extend
the alternative remedy of restitution beyond the count of money had
and received. Quantum valebat was not recognized in such cases. An
unjustifiable restriction on the availability of the restitutionary reme-
dy became at least partly the ground for an equally unjustified en-
largement of the statute of limitations.
But if the Miller case was correctly decided, the Currier decision
is questionable. The Currier case was decided on the ground that by
the running of the tort statute for the conversion the defendant got
title to the property and therefore sold his own goods, not those of
the plaintiff. But this can also be said where the defendant does not
sell the converted chattel, and in Kirkman v. Phillips' Heirs,3 4 it was
properly disposed of as follows: "It is true, as argued, that a wrong-
doer may obtain a title to the property by three years adverse posses-
sion, and yet be liable for three years after his title is perfected to
130 WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 294 (Boston, 1913).
'31 See Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. 133 (Mass. 1828).
132 Currier v. Studley, 159 Mass. 17, 33 N. E. 709 (1893).
133 KEENER, QUASI CONTRACTS 175-178 (New York, 1893).
'34 7 Heisk (54 Tenn.) 222 (1872).
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pay the original owner the value thereof. This is a necessary conse-
quence of the right which the original owner has to elect whether
he will sue for property or its value. During six years his right to sue
for the value is as perfect as his right to sue for the property within
three years."
The court in the Cornelius case properly held, as stated earlier,
that the longer contract statute of limitations applies when restitution
is invoked as an alternative remedy for the tort of conversion. "The
statute of limitations," said the Appellate Division, "pertains to the
remedy rather than the substantive right. The contractual limita-
tion should be applied where the cause of action has been fitted to
the contractual remedy." ' ' Three main cases were cited by the court
in support of its decision. Two of these cases15 6 held that an action
for restitution (i.e., for money had and received) governed by the six
years' statute could be brought by or on behalf of a corporation for
corporate waste by the defendants from which they secured a benefit.
The third case, Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co.,1s'
showed how the alternative remedy of restitution for conversion may
be of value in the law of negotiable instruments. This case is both a
clear holding (though not plainly stated as such in the opinion of the
court) that the alternative remedy is governed by the six years' con-
tract statute, not the three years' statute which controls an action for
conversion, and at the same time represents a refusal to apply this
holding in all situations.
X, indebted to the plaintiff, drew its check on the defendant
drawee bank for part of the indebtedness, payable to the plaintiff,
and gave the check to Y for delivery to the plaintiff. Y forged the
plaintiff's signature and presented it at the defendant bank, which
135 Cf. Cohen v. City of New York, 283 N. Y. 112, 27 N. E. 2d 803 (1940), an
action for money had and received to recover money which the defendant obtained
by fraud. Concededly the statute of limitations would have run from the time of dis-
covery of the fraud by the plaintiff if he had sued in tort, but the court appeared
to hold that since the action was for money had and received, the statute began to
run from the time the money was obtained. See, for a contrary holding, Adams v.
Harrison, 34 Cal. App. 2d 288, 93 P. 2d 237 (1939). The California decision is clearly
preferable, since it does not subject the alternative action for restitution in tort cases
to a disability greater than that applicable to the tort action itself. See Thurston,
Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45 MIcHr. L. Rav. 935, 949 (1947).
See also supra, at note 23.
136 Gottfried v. Gottfried, 269 App. Div. 413, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 50 (1st Dep't.
1945); Myer v. Myer, 271 App. Div. 465, 66 N. Y. S. 2d 83 (1st Dep't. 1946), aff'd.
296 N. Y. 979, 73 N. E. 2d 562 (1947).
137 303 N. Y. 27, 100 N. E. 2d 117 (1952).
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either cashed it or credited it to Y's account. A second check issued
by X to the plaintiff's order was drawn on the Security Trust Com-
pany, as drawee, and similarly given to Y for delivery to plaintiff.
Y forged the plaintiff's endorsement on this check too, and presented
it to the defendant bank, which accepted it and thereafter either paid
or credited Y with the proceeds of the check. The defendant, in
other words, was the drawee bank as to the first check and the col-
lecting bank as to the second check.
The plaintiff did not discover that the checks had been issued
until about three years later, and brought action after the expiration
of three years from the date of the forgeries. The first cause of action
in the complaint had to do with the first check, the second with the
second check. As to both, plaintiff sought recovery on a contractual
theory.
Holding that the first cause of action was one for conversion
governed by a three years' statute, the court decided that it was out-
lawed. There was no privity between the plaintiff and the defbndant
drawee, the court said, to support an action based on a contractual
theory. "The drawee becomes liable in contract to the drawer and
the indorsers become liable to the drawee. The privity is apparent.
As between the drawee and the payee, however, there is no contrac-
tual relation."138
The second cause of action, however, in which the defendant
bank acted as the collecting agent, was upheld as having been prop-
erly brought on a contractual theory. The court reasoned that "a col-
lecting bank is merely an agent for the purpose of collecting from the
drawee bank the proceeds of the check delivered to it. When it takes
the check for collection it assents to the agency and becomes bound
by the terms of the instrument received. Those terms include an
obligation to pay the proceeds collected to the true payee owner in
the absence of a valid endorsement. The moment the collecting bank
receives the proceeds it holds money belonging to the owner of the
check and becomes a debtor of such owner and of no one else in the
absence of a valid endorsement."' 39
It is submitted that the relationship between the payee whose
signature has been forged and the collecting bank is no more contrac-
tual than the relationship between such a payee and the drawee bank.
138 Id. at 31, 100 N. E. 2d at 119.
139 Id. at 32, 100 N. E. 2d at 120.
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The collecting bank is a wrongdoer when it turns over the proceeds
of the check to the forger, not an agent for anybody, and the so-
called contractual action which the aggrieved payee is allowed to
bring against the collecting bank is our old friend-the alternative
remedy of restitution for the tort of conversion. The so-called agency
of the collecting bank for the aggrieved payee results from a fictitious
"ratification" which is supposed to be accomplished by "waiver" of
the tort and suit in assumpsit. This is clearly stated in the New York
decisions cited in the Henderson case.14° This also appears from the
language of a Maryland decision' 4 ' quoted in the Henderson case.
To say, therefore, that there is "privity" in one situation but not in
another is to give undeserved reality to the fictitious contractual
analogy of the alternative restitutionary remedy in tort cases. The
court in the Henderson case failed to indicate why, if for the conver-
sion in the second cause of action the alternative remedy of restitu-
tion could be invoked, the same remedy should not be allowed as to
the conversion alleged in the first cause of action.
In a recent case 4 where the plaintiff sought through an alter-
native action of restitution to recover the proceeds received by the
defendant from the publication and sale of a book which allegedly
libelled the plaintiff, the court held that the one year statute applica-
ble to libel controlled the case. The plaintiff's action, which was com-
menced a little less than six years after the publication, was held to
be outlawed. Argument may be had with much in the opinion of
the court at Special Term. It was implied, for example, that the
alternative restitutionary remedy is limited to torts which involve
injury to property, not to those having to do with personal injury.
The court found a legislative intention, when the statute for libel
was cut down from two years to one year in 1936, to limit the action
to one year whatever the theory. It is doubtful whether any such in-
tention, or any particular intention in the matter, may be attributed
140 See Moon v. Security Bank of New York, 176 App. Div. 842, 163 N. Y. Supp.
277 (1st Dep't. 1917), aff'd. 225 N. Y. 723, 122 N. E. 879 (1919) (contains a good
discussion of the reality that so-called "waiver" of tort is an election of alternative
remedies) ; Comstock v. Hier, 73 N. Y. 269 (1878) (for the collecting bank's conver-
sion the plaintiff may in the alternative sue for money had and received).
14' National Union Bank of Maryland v. Miller Rubber Co., 148 Md. 455, 129
Atl. 690 (1925). See BPRTTo N, HAxnaoox or T LAW OF BaTrS AND NOTES 683, 689
(St. Paul, 1943).
142 Hart v. E. P. Dutton & Co., 197 Misc. 274, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 871 (1949),
aff'd. 277 App. Div. 939, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 773 (4th Dep't. 1950), leave to appeal den.,
99 N. Y. S. 2d 1014 (1950).
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to the legislature. Libels do not customarily result in unjust enrich-
ment, and it is just as possible to urge that the statute, whether be-
fore or after 1936, contemplated solely actions for damages, not the
remedy of restitution.
The decision can, however, be explained on the ground that the
remedy of restitution is not suitable to a case where, as in the case
under consideration, the plaintiff was one of many libelled in the pub-
lication. Allocation of unjust enrichment reaped at the expense of the
plaintiff might well be impossible. The case is interesting, at all
events, in pointing up some of the fields of inquiry which are opened
by the alternative remedy of restitution.
